By now you'll have seen extensive coverage of the Government's Budget forecasts for GDP, employment, inflation, the exchange rate, and all the rest of it. What you probably won't have seen much of in the media is coverage of the 'what ifs' - what if the Government's forecasts don't pan out? What might happen instead? What would the fiscal books look like if the domestic or global economies did a lot better or a lot worse than the Government expected?
Again, this is one of the questions that is actually addressed in the bundle of bumph that comes with the Budget (specifically, in Chapter 3, 'Risks and Scenarios', in the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update, often known as the BEFU).
The good news is that the economic outlook has picked up since last December's Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update (you guessed it, the HYEFU). Back then, the risks to the outlook had been skewed to the downside - the probability was that if events unfolded in an unexpected way, it would be for the worse, and there were good reasons for that. The finances of the Eurozone's most indebted economies were still in disarray, the US was skidding towards the top of the 'fiscal cliff', and there were worries that China might have been heading for a significant slowdown in its rate of growth. Here at home, the impact of the Canterbury rebuild on economic activity always seemed to be just over the horizon and never actually here yet, and there had been an unexpectedly sharp jump in the unemployment rate. And there wasn't much that looked like springing an unexpected pleasant surprise.
This time round, Treasury reckons - and I think they've got it right - that the risks are more evenly balanced, and that things are as likely to be better than the Government expects as they are to be worse. This, of course, is the same conclusion that the world's equity markets have also come to this year: things aren't as bleak as they looked four or five months ago, and share prices have risen substantially pretty much everywhere as a result.
Why be more optimistic? The US, despite its dysfunctional policymaking, avoided the 'cliff', though it's still a long way from getting out of its partisan policy omnishambles; the Eurozone has made some progress with some of its more indebted problem children, though still has plenty of problems on its plate; China is still growing at a vigorous rate, even if not quite at the rates of before. And at home the Canterbury rebuild is finally showing some legs, and recent economic data (including the unemployment rate) have been notably better than before.
Obviously, there are still risks - the drought could be really bad, a wheel could come off in one of the bigger Eurozone countries, whatever - but there's now as much reason to be optimistic as pessimistic.
It's nice to see, too, that whichever of the Treasury's 'upside' or 'downside' scenarios might actually play out, the economy looks to be in reasonable shape either way. Even on the downside scenario, there's no recession (which, as I mentioned in my April 28 post, 'Recession - what recession?', is also the view of the rest of the forecasting community), and unemployment continues to fall (but more slowly). Treasury notes (correctly) that its 'upside' and 'downside' scenarios don't cover every eventuality - something much better, or much worse, could still happen - but on a sensible guess at the likely range of outcomes, things look reasonably comfortable either way.
If there's any big difference between the upside and downside scenarios, it's on the interest rate front. Treasury's central forecast is that the 90 day bank bill yield will stay around its current 2.7% for another year or so, and then gradually rise to 4.8% by March 2017. If the economy does really well, though, house prices will rise more sharply, inflation pressures will pick up, and we'll hear a more forceful message from the Reserve Bank, with the 90 day bank bill yield rising to 6% rather than 4.8%.
Obviously, a really good burst of economic growth would be terrific for everyone. Just don't expect to continue to get dirt-cheap mortgages if we have one.
Thursday, 16 May 2013
Today’s Budget – the outlook for profits
As I've indicated earlier, some of the best stuff that comes
along in the Budget isn't in the Budget speech itself or in the main supporting
documents like the Economic Outlook,
but are tucked away in the more subsidiary supporting tables and statistics.
The thing I always reach for first is called the ‘Additional Information’ – it doesn't sound very promising, but that’s where all that cyclically-adjusted and
commodity-price-adjusted data came from, for example.
It's also the source of Treasury's forecast of the level of profits in the economy. As far as I know, there isn't any other regular, authoritative stab at forecasting business profits, and Statistics New Zealand doesn't publish quarterly profit statistics like the ones you get in Australia or the US. Yet it's self-evidently an extremely important measure of how New Zealand businesses are travelling, and it's essential if you want to have some feel for the correct valuation of New Zealand equities.
In the 'Additional Information' material you find a forecast of
what Treasury calls 'Net operating surplus': this is a good proxy for what's
happening to profits. Excluding agriculture, profits are expected to have risen
slightly in the year to March ’13 (+1.5%), are expected to have a boomer of a
year this coming year (+13.9%, year to March ’14), and then to have a string of fairly
small increases (+2.5% to March ’15 , +4.2% to March ’16 , and +1.6% to March
’17).
What that suggests to me is that the recent strong rises in
the New Zealand share market have had some solid macroeconomic justification
(investors were likely taking on board the coming year's good times), but
something else probably needs to come into the mix to take local
shares higher again.
Today's Budget - fiscal balance (3)
Earlier posts fossicked through some of the better measures
of what’s really happening to the fiscal position than the headline numbers
that get the big coverage, and by and large they showed that fiscal policy is
on the right track – the projected surpluses are ‘real’, and the fiscal books
look like they can come good without doing too much short-term harm to the
economy.
Before we all get too euphoric, though, the current figures
are flattered somewhat by the fact that New Zealand incomes are currently
getting a – possibly unsustainable – boost from high prices for our export
commodities. The tax take is getting its share of those high dairy payouts (for
example), and if global dairy prices fall, so will the government’s revenues.
Maybe the government’s finances ought to be looked at, as if they weren't getting this windfall?
And that’s done by Treasury too, again in the documents down the
back of the Budget materials. I mentioned earlier that the cyclically adjusted
fiscal deficit in this June 2013 fiscal year will be 1.8% of GDP. If you said that commodity prices ought to be
around their longer-term average (say over the past 20 or 30 or 50 years)
rather than where they are today (namely, in the stratosphere), then the ‘more
normal state of affairs’ fiscal deficit blows out from 1.8% of GDP to more like
3% of GDP.
That’s a bit of a worry: we wouldn't want to see some shock
to the global economy happening any time soon that sent commodity prices
sharply lower, as that would expose a bit of a vulnerability in our fiscal
position.
Of course, it’s possible that commodity prices have moved
permanently higher for a good reason (thumping great increases in demand in
Asia, for one thing). If that’s the case, there’s obviously much less cause to
worry. Another measure that Treasury calculates is a statistical one that simply smooths out commodity prices – in current circumstances, the method
assumes that commodity prices would have risen but not as abruptly as they
actually have, and it doesn't assume that they will drop back to some lower
level again. On that basis, as you’d expect, there’s much less to worry
about : the deficit is only a little larger (on average) in coming years than
otherwise.
The truth is probably somewhere in between the two
measurement methods – there’s probably some modest flattery of the government
accounts from current world commodity markets, but not enough to make you
question the plausibility of being able to get back to a sustainable fiscal
position.
Today's Budget - the fiscal balance (2)
Another aspect that doesn't get enough attention in the
media coverage is whether the Budget is adding to (‘expansionary’) or
subtracting from (‘contractionary’) growth in the overall economy. Increases in
the fiscal deficit are generally regarded as good for the economy, at least in
the short run: this is the orthodox ‘Keynesian’ view. Similarly, tightening
fiscal policy (by raising more tax or by lower government spending) is regarded
as a brake on the economy. Without doing any sophisticated number-crunching at
all, you’d guess that if Bill English is
working the fiscal position from a deficit to a surplus, the Budget must be
‘contractionary’, and you’d be right.
It’s interesting to put numbers on it, though. First, however,
a bit of jargon: if the cyclically adjusted deficit this year is (say) 3% of
GDP, and next year’s is (say) 2% of GDP, then fiscal policy has tightened by 1%
of GDP (either taxes have been raised by 1% of GDP, or government spending is
lower by 1% of GDP, or there’s some combination of the two adding up to 1% of
GDP). This 1% tightening – the difference between one year’s cyclically
adjusted balance and the next – is known as the ‘fiscal impulse’, and is a
useful summary of the overall stance of fiscal policy. Okay: end of jargon,
here’s a graph of the thing.
Downward pointing bars mean that fiscal policy has got
tighter, and it’s probably best to focus most on the right-hand-most ones for
each year, which strip out the impact of various earthquake payments. As you
can see, fiscal policy is expected to be contractionary pretty much
indefinitely into the future.
And that’s fine: despite fiscal policy tightening by about 0.6% of GDP a year
over the five years 2012/3 to 2016/7,
the overall economy continues to grow at a reasonable rate (+2.5% a year over
the period) while the government’s finances move into much better order. Again,
we’re fortunate that we’re starting from manageable levels of deficit and
manageable levels of government debt: one of the tragedies of the Eurozone
‘austerity’ policies is that, from their much worse starting position, they can’t pull off the same trick of
simultaneously fixing the government’s books and keeping the economy growing.
Today’s Budget – the fiscal balance (1)
You’ll have seen the main news in the Budget elsewhere – still
on track for fiscal surpluses, reduced ACC levies, the sale of Meridian, housing
initiatives – so you don’t need any recap here. I've concentrated on some of
the more out-of-the-way but important aspects which don’t always get their fair
share of air-time.
As always the main media focus is on the headline numbers for the
fiscal surplus or deficit – where the government still expects to squeak into
the black in the 2014-15 fiscal year with a tiny surplus of $75 million, and is
then planning to run rather a small surplus of 0.3% of GDP in the 2015-16 year
and a rather larger one of 1% of GDP in the 2016-17 year.
While these numbers get the headlines, they don’t really
tell you what you most want to know. That’s because the fiscal surplus or
deficit moves up and down of its own accord, depending on the state of the
economy: in good times, tax revenues increase and payments on the likes of
unemployment deficit go down, none of it due to any policy changes or good or
bad management by the government. It’s purely a cyclical phenomenon.
To see
what the impact of the government’s decisions actually is, you have to strip
out those purely cyclical influences on the economy. How you do it in practice
is more art than science, but various organisations give it a go, including
(obviously enough) the Treasury itself. The ‘cyclically adjusted balance’, or CAB, is the result. As the graph below
shows, the deficit today isn't really as bad as it looks. In the June 2013
year, the headline deficit is 2.9% of GDP, but the impact of the earthquake
accounts for about 0.6% of GDP and the weakish state of the economy accounts
for another 0.5% of GDP. Take those out – in other words, assume it’s a normal
year with no major disasters and the economy in okay shape – and the deficit
would have been only 1.8% of GDP.
That’s reasonably good news: we’re not starting from the
sort of fiscal black hole that many other OECD economies find themselves in,
where the true underlying state of the public finances is dire. A fiscal
deficit of 1.8% of GDP isn't something you’d want to go on running
indefinitely, but it’s not the end of the world, either, as a place to be
starting out from.
The other bit of good news is that the fiscal surpluses that
the government is projecting for future years are actually real – they’re not
just a reflection of the economy getting better. In the graph, you can see that there’s no difference between the headline surplus numbers and the cyclically adjusted ones.
Monday, 13 May 2013
Dig in, or push on?
In my post (May 10) on recent interesting non-fiction titles, I recommended Alex Stone's book on magic. I was only partway into it at the time, and hadn't reached page 147, where Stone (who'd at that point got into trouble with the magicians' professional authorities by supposedly giving away secrets of the trade to the public), says, partly in his own defence but also more generally
That's not, of course, how incumbent firms tend to view it. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, in a recent scathing article for Project Syndicate, has written about how (in his view) one US company is not only pushing the bounds of over-aggressive defence of its patent rights - it's gone all the way to the US Supreme Court - but also deliberately impeding the development of alternatives to its technology. His conclusion is that "unbalanced intellectual-property regimes result in inefficiencies—including monopoly profits and a failure to maximize the use of knowledge—that impede the pace of innovation", and argues that America's intellectual property regime is indeed unbalanced, over-favouring the possessors of today's technology. While you're at it, if you haven't come across it before, have a fossick around the Project Syndicate site, it's well worth it.
Finally, if you really want to see blatant protectionism of threatened incumbents, from this morning's edition of the excellent Slate, here's a specially appalling example.
"I don't think that it's any coincidence that the golden age of stage magic was also the golden age of exposures [publicising how tricks work], because exposure drives innovation. Much in the way that market-oriented competition among businesses fosters economic growth by forcing companies to evolve, exposure compels magicians to modernise their acts and invent new material. Secrecy, meanwhile, is a license to be lazy. Like monopolies in the marketplace it breeds stagnation".Stone's not an economist (he's been a PhD physics student, professional magician, and author), but can spot the essence of why and how many markets work. It's obvious to him that innovation-driven competition is what makes us all better off. It's even, as Stone notes, in the long-run interests of the incumbent firms themselves.
That's not, of course, how incumbent firms tend to view it. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, in a recent scathing article for Project Syndicate, has written about how (in his view) one US company is not only pushing the bounds of over-aggressive defence of its patent rights - it's gone all the way to the US Supreme Court - but also deliberately impeding the development of alternatives to its technology. His conclusion is that "unbalanced intellectual-property regimes result in inefficiencies—including monopoly profits and a failure to maximize the use of knowledge—that impede the pace of innovation", and argues that America's intellectual property regime is indeed unbalanced, over-favouring the possessors of today's technology. While you're at it, if you haven't come across it before, have a fossick around the Project Syndicate site, it's well worth it.
Finally, if you really want to see blatant protectionism of threatened incumbents, from this morning's edition of the excellent Slate, here's a specially appalling example.
Saturday, 11 May 2013
Sex and economics
Who could resist an article that starts, "John Maynard Keynes was the sexiest economist who ever lived"? Read on here. Thanks to the very excellent Arts & Letters Daily website which rebroadcast the article, originally from The American Prospect.
Mighty River Power - the bigger picture
So Mighty River Power has got away, at a small premium (closing at $2.62 versus the initial $2.50). All well and good. A lot of the news coverage has understandably been about the last minute spoiler from Labour and the Greens, the scale of the share uptake, and the listing price, which are all fair enough topics. Missing, though, even from the Government itself, is any core explanation of why privatisations like MRP are a good idea. Fran O'Sullivan's piece in today's Herald is a fairly rare example of looking at some of the broader context, although it concentrates heavily on just one aspect, the contribution that listings of SOEs can make to the development of broader, deeper, local capital markets.
The core case for privatisation has mostly gone unheard, so here it is: in most circumstances, and certainly looking at our government's asset portfolio, government ownership of commercial assets is bad policy. There is no good reason for a government to own businesses that would be created in any event.
Ask yourself: should the government own a chain of video rental shops? A newspaper? Some corner dairies? Shoe shops? Bookstores? A car manufacturer? A computer maker? Massage parlours? Kiwifruit orchards? The answer is obviously, no: government money is expensive to raise (through taxes or through debt), we can get all those services without its involvement, and there are desperately more needed goods and services that the government ought to be providing with its scarce resources (infrastructure in particular, but also unmet needs in education and health).
There's a variety of other ancillary arguments against state ownership and for privatisation (the capital markets one, the probability that state-owned businesses will be run less well than profit-oriented ones, and various distortions to markets working properly), but the key point is that for many commercial activities, state ownership is both pointless and wasteful.
You can see it for yourself: the government's current portfolio has the same lack of underlying logic as video stores or newspapers would have: a TV station (producing, incidentally, output worse than many privately-owned ones), a radio station (for once, a rare example of where some public service ethos has been maintained), and a bunch of assorted assets (a bank, coal mines, an airline, energy companies) producing things that in most western countries are routinely and competently delivered by private businesses. Daftest of all, the government (in Landcorp) owns a string of dairy farms. Puh-leez!
Remind yourself, next time you see long waiting lists for life-altering operations in the health system, or stew in a traffic jam in Auckland, or wish your kid's school was better resourced: gee, isn't it great that the government is using my taxes to milk some cows.
The core case for privatisation has mostly gone unheard, so here it is: in most circumstances, and certainly looking at our government's asset portfolio, government ownership of commercial assets is bad policy. There is no good reason for a government to own businesses that would be created in any event.
Ask yourself: should the government own a chain of video rental shops? A newspaper? Some corner dairies? Shoe shops? Bookstores? A car manufacturer? A computer maker? Massage parlours? Kiwifruit orchards? The answer is obviously, no: government money is expensive to raise (through taxes or through debt), we can get all those services without its involvement, and there are desperately more needed goods and services that the government ought to be providing with its scarce resources (infrastructure in particular, but also unmet needs in education and health).
There's a variety of other ancillary arguments against state ownership and for privatisation (the capital markets one, the probability that state-owned businesses will be run less well than profit-oriented ones, and various distortions to markets working properly), but the key point is that for many commercial activities, state ownership is both pointless and wasteful.
You can see it for yourself: the government's current portfolio has the same lack of underlying logic as video stores or newspapers would have: a TV station (producing, incidentally, output worse than many privately-owned ones), a radio station (for once, a rare example of where some public service ethos has been maintained), and a bunch of assorted assets (a bank, coal mines, an airline, energy companies) producing things that in most western countries are routinely and competently delivered by private businesses. Daftest of all, the government (in Landcorp) owns a string of dairy farms. Puh-leez!
Remind yourself, next time you see long waiting lists for life-altering operations in the health system, or stew in a traffic jam in Auckland, or wish your kid's school was better resourced: gee, isn't it great that the government is using my taxes to milk some cows.
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