Monday, 27 May 2013

World famous in The Guardian

There I was, browsing through the online Guardian (May 26 edition), and I came across an excerpt from a new book by celebrity restaurant and food critic Jay Rayner - you'll have seen him, if you're a foodie like me, in various programmes on Sky's Food Channel. And there, under the headline 'Why worrying about food miles is missing the point', was a reference to a 2006 paper written by Prof Caroline Saunders of Lincoln University and two colleagues, Greg Taylor, also from Lincoln, and Andrew Barber, from The AgriBusiness Group.

The gist of the article was that Rayner had until recently been an uncritical supporter of the 'food miles' idea, which is that it is supposedly better for the planet if you buy locally, saving all the fuel and emissions that transporting your food from the other side of the world would have involved.

The flaw in the notion, if you haven't figured it out for yourself already, is that the impact on the planet depends on the total carbon footprint involved in getting the food to you. Producing low yields in unfavourable conditions (where you might need heated glasshouses, for example) requires more total energy than producing high yields in favourable conditions, even after transport costs (usually only a very small fraction of the total cost in any event) are factored in. And Caroline and her mates did the heavy lifting to show that the likes of New Zealand's lamb and apples are easier on the planet than the local UK ones.

Rayner, to his credit, was admitting to an evidence-based change of heart, starting with reading the New Zealand paper and progressing to other research, which he also cites. If you'd prefer to go to the New Zealand source for yourself, it's here.

It reminded me, too, of something I've often wondered about. On the same total footprint basis, I wonder if electric cars are really as good for the planet as they claim?

Saturday, 25 May 2013

Measuring the degree of competition

It got surprisingly little media or analyst coverage, but last Tuesday (21st) the Electricity Authority released the results of the latest surveys it has conducted of the perceived levels of competition in various branches of retailing. They were particularly interested in electricity retailing, naturally, but they also included a wide range of other major retailing sectors - the banks, electrical goods stores, online book stores, petrol stations, the supermarkets, and the telcos.

People were asked, "Using a 0-10 scale where 0 means not at all competitive, 5 means just adequate and 10 means extremely competitive, how competitive are the following businesses in terms of working to get your business and offering you the best deals? If you do not know enough, just say so".

The graph below summarises consumers' responses, and compares them to a similar 2011 survey the Authority had also carried out (and which, I regret to say, flew below my radar at the time).
Granted, these are perceptions rather than any underlying reality: retailers, if observed selling the same thing at the same price, could in principle be in near-perfect competition, or they could be in close collusion, and a consumer wouldn't necessarily know which. On the other hand, people aren't mugs, and can often be trusted to figure out the nature of the options they're shown. So I'd be surprised if these perceptions were wildly off the mark of the reality.

One bit of good news is that, over the past two years, perceived levels of competition have risen across all the retail sectors surveyed. Hopefully, that's the structural reality, and not something cyclical - the  ANZ-Roy Morgan Consumer Confidence Survey has risen strongly over the same period, and maybe households are just feeling more upbeat about everything - because increased competition generally contributes to both productivity and innovation. The UK's Office of Fair Trading published a very good paper in 2007 showing the various ways in which this happens, if you're interested in more.

Competition - consumers' views

One oddity in the graph above, however, is the low perceived competitiveness of online bookstores: my pre-survey guess would have been that they would have featured very favourably. Amazon, and the online operations of Barnes & Noble and of Sydney's excellent  Abbey's bookstore, certainly make a good deal of effort to get my custom. That's where the Electricity Authority's simultaneous survey of 81 'stakeholders' is rather helpful. It was mostly major players in the electricity industry (generators, distributors, retailers), but also had energy users and energy consumer representatives, plus some investors, educational institutions, and professional bodies. 

Their, arguably more informed, assessment, is shown in the graph below. And it fixes the anomaly: the online booksellers move from bottom (in the consumer survey) to middle of the pack (in the stakeholder survey). Otherwise the assessment is pretty much the same as the consumer one - which rather leads you to believe that both surveys may be picking up the same underlying reality - except that the stakeholders rate electrical goods stores more competitive than supermarkets, which is plausible, too. I certainly feel I've got more choice when it comes to PCs than when it comes to groceries.

Competition - stakeholders' views

There was also an interesting table in the consumer survey, reproduced below, showing the level of 'Don't knows' for each of the retailing sectors.

Distribution of consumers' answers

By and large, consumers feel they know whether they're being offered a more or less competitive landscape. As I say, they could be wrong, and they might be getting smoke blown in their eyes by a simulacrum of competition - marketing ballyhoo in one small part of a market, for example, disguising lethargic competition in the bulk of it - but on its face it's quite an encouraging result.

It helps to explain the online booksellers, too. That's the only retail sector in this survey where there were very high numbers of people who were unsure about the level of competition. It seems odd to me - I would have thought the word had got out about the Amazons and Book Depositories of this world - but evidently not. My guess would be that next time this survey is done, the 'Unsures' will have dropped quite a bit, and the online operations will come out in a more favourable light.

Wednesday, 22 May 2013

The perks of office

For six weeks in 1987 (as I mentioned in the previous post) I got seconded to the Leader of the Opposition's office as an economic adviser. I did it mostly for the intrinsic interest of it, and partly because I'd done a stint as an adviser to a rather controversial Irish government minister, and had learnt a few things that I thought I could put to good use.

All well and good. What I wasn't prepared for was that I was now - not a VIP exactly, but more a Somewhat Important Person - in Parliamentary Services' grand scheme of things. And that meant that, at 7.15am each morning, a chauffeured car arrived outside our house in Pauatahanui, to carry me away in style to help to attend to the great matters of state. Sadly, it all stopped on election day (August 15). As, of course, it should.

If you're a fan of Yes, Minister, you might ask, were the New Zealand Parliamentary Services drivers as much in the know as their counterparts were in Jim Hacker's UK? You might very well think so, but I could not possibly comment.

The political economy of opposition

I've been thinking about the Labour/Green proposals to introduce a monopoly purchaser of electricity, as a mooted way of driving electricity prices down.I have to assume their proposals were well-intentioned and sincere, but equally there was a lot of media comment (and business pushback) suggesting that the policy was an opportunistic spoiler of the Mighty River share float.

It reminded me of an episode that occurred back in 1987, when I got seconded by the BNZ to be Jim Bolger's economic adviser. Apparently, the tradition was - and I have to say it's a nice one, and I hope it's still respected - that someone in Treasury got deputed to help out the office of the Leader of the Opposition once a general election got underway, so as to even up the odds a bit. Trouble was, the reform-minded Treasury of the time had a low opinion of National, assuming that National was still in the grips of Muldoon's dirigisme, and I don't blame them. I'd have felt the same way in their shoes, too.

In short, nobody in Treasury could be persuaded to go along. So the call went out: is there an economist in the public sector that could be persuaded to give it a go? The flying fickle finger of fate pointed towards the BNZ (then still government owned). The top brass at the BNZ dithered for a while but eventually, said, okay, partly because I'd done this kind of job before in Ireland.

A big issue for National back then was how to respond to one of Labour's set piece policies - GST (which had been introduced the previous year). The National team went into reflexive oppositional mode: GST is a work of the devil, we won't have it, we'll do something completely different. For tragic policy wonks who might want to know, the alternative National came up with at the time was called the X-tax ('X' being 'expenditure'), which as I remember it was a sales tax on spending in the shops. And as an adviser, you banged your head against the politics of those days. The alternative policy might be poor, or inferior to the government's policy, but any talk along those lines got trumped by what seemed to be the political axiom of those times: we have to be seen to oppose. Opposing rallies our supporters, and attracts defectors from the other camp.

Except if you are creating credibility problems for yourself later on. National lost in a landslide, and post-election the supposedly superior policy of an X-tax was quietly buried, never to be exhumed again. Exactly the same process, by the way, played out in Australia, where Labor portrayed John Howard's introduction of GST in 2000 as a terrible idea, only to leave it in place when they got in.

How, as an opposition, do you establish your credibility as a potentially competent manager of the economy, when you are faced with the modern-day equivalent of a big new policy like GST?
From what I observed in 1987, the wrecking-ball, or the reflex "we'll do the opposite", risks coming across as political posturing in the voters' eyes, and not seen as primarily concerned about what's best for the economy.

There are alternative ways. Say that the government policy goes too far? Sure. Too late, too little? No problem. We'll open the books and look at the problem when we get in? That can work. It's just what we'd have done if we were in power? Not the path often followed, but can sometimes be true, gets traction with the electorate for candour, and doesn't leave you in the awkward position of having to backtrack on what you once said, as and when you end up in the Beehive.

There will, of course, be occasions where an opposition will genuinely have good reasons to junk an incumbent policy - we saw this play out in industrial relations legislation in particular, where successively we had the Employment Contracts Act (National), then the Employment Relations Act (Labour), then amendments to the ERA (National again) - and the electorate will agree with them, and that's obviously fine.

That said, economic credibility for an opposition is an extremely valuable asset, hard to accumulate and easy to dissipate (much the same is true of central banks). Look at the UK: it took the UK Labour Party 18 years (1979-'97) to rebuild itself as a plausible economic manager, after the chaos of the "winter of discontent" (1978-79) of James Callaghan's administration. And then it took the Conservatives 13 years (1997-2010) in the wilderness before they were again seen as credible, after the assorted problems of John Major's government (including getting forcibly driven out of the European Monetary System in 1992). Hoarding your credibility is still playing out there, too: polls show that the voters, despite the swingeing austerity policies of the Conservative/LibDem coalition, rate the incumbents as better economic managers than Labour.

Tuesday, 21 May 2013

Data you should notice

One of the odd things about media coverage of economic developments is that some releases get lots of coverage, while others go largely unreported.

As a financial journalist in a previous life, I can understand how this happens: you develop some contacts at a particular institution - at one point when I lived in Tokyo I was the world expert on the Japanese syndicated loan market (I appreciate this is not anyone's life ambition) because I knew who to ask about the latest deals - so you invest some effort into understanding the data that originators produce, and you get comfortable with them. If they seem to have a good feel for what's going in their neck of the woods, you tend to stick with them, and you don't pay much mind to alternative data sources.

All that said, it's a little bit odd that the Reserve Bank's surveys of private sector expectations get such little coverage. It's not the fault of the comms folk at the RB: they're diligent, and personable. But for whatever reason, the RB's survey doesn't get much airtime.

And that's a pity. The survey is, to be sure, mostly aimed at things the Reserve Bank, more than anyone else, would most like to know, and it's not tailored for mass consumption. From the RB's perspective, they are especially interested in inflation expectations, and in people's perception of whether monetary policy is a stimulus or a brake on the economy. On the latter point, you might think that there couldn't be a great deal of debate on the stance of policy - either the Reserve Bank is aiming to boost activity, or it's aiming to slow things down, and by and large the Bank tells you where it is at - but at the end of the day, what some policy authority intends may not match up at all well with what its target constituency is actually experiencing. And as we'll see in a moment, its target constituency has mixed views.

So here (given that I'd bet a dollar or two the mainstream media haven't covered it) is what the latest Reserve Bank survey is telling us.

You can see it for yourself here, but before we go there I should disclose upfront that I'm one of the respondents to this survey. In passing, this might be a bit presumptuous, and the Reserve Bank might have its own reasons for the people it asks, but the number of people the Bank consults is getting a bit on the thin side. In this latest survey. they sent out 117 questionnaires, and got 71 responses back. That's not awful, but it's not fully covering the waterfront, either. If you think your view is as good as anyone else's, why don't you have a word with the RB about participating? Get in touch with Mike Hannah, their PR guy. Tell him I sent you. When he's finished laughing, he might still add you to the survey panel.

Where was I? Oh yes - the latest survey results. Four things.

One, we don't have a generalised inflation problem. Whether you look at the immediate inflation outlook, or 1 or 2 years ahead, the answer comes out the same. People expect inflation to fall, and to be well within the RB's 1-3% inflation target.

Two, and despite the benign inflation outlook, people expect monetary policy to become a bit tighter. That could be for lots of reasons. Many people might reckon (rightly) that we needed lower interest rates in the wake of the Canterbury earthquakes - the RB was quite explicit at the time about providing support to the economy, as an insurance policy, to help us through the impact - but equally, now that it's obvious that the economy is on an upswing, that insurance policy is no longer needed. It's possible, too, that respondents to the survey have some sympathy with the Bank's concerns about frothy housing markets.

Three, people have differing views about the current orientation of monetary policy. Before I tell you what the survey says, what's your own perception of the stance of monetary policy - easy? middle of the road?  tough? If you found that an easy question to answer, that's fine, but you may be missing something:  the respondents to the latest survey didn't find it an easy question to answer at all. They were all over the place: just over a quarter of them thought monetary policy was tight, 15% thought it was neutral, 60% (give or take) thought it was easy.

What's going on here? We have one of the most transparent monetary policy regimes in the world. The Bank goes to great lengths to tell us, upfront (rather than well after the event), what it's doing, and why. How can there be this range of views about its stance?

The short answer is that respondents are actually weighing up both interest rates (which are very low) and the exchange rate (which is very high). How that combination impacts you is an entirely empirical matter, and if you're an exporter (for example) you could well, and honestly, report that, taken in the round, monetary conditions are making life difficult for you. All the more reason, by the way, for paying more attention to indices of monetary policy that include both interest rates and exchange rates, and arguably other measures too (for example, the availability of credit,and  the feasibility of raising equity on the share market). Have a look at my April 23 post about the Monetary Conditions Index, which makes the same sort of points. On that overall monetary conditions basis, by the way, you'd have said that monetary policy was relatively restrictive, despite low interest rates.

Four, and despite incessant hand-wringing reports in the media to the contrary, the survey respondents believe the economy's in a growth phase. There wasn't a single respondent who expected a fall in GDP in either the March or June quarters; no respondent expected a fall in GDP in either the year to March '14 or the year to March '15; and the consensus view was that GDP would grow by 2.5% in the year to next March, and by 2.8% in the year to March '15.

Expectations can of course prove off the mark, but wherever you look - and the latest BNZ/Business New Zealand performance indices for manufacturing and services, published in the last few days, are as good a place to look as any - the New Zealand economy is on an upswing.

Saturday, 18 May 2013

A bright idea from Hollande

I didn't get much from President Hollande's big set-piece press conference this week - apart from a vaguely expressed desire to get Europe "moving" again, and some predictable side-swipes at the UK's lack of enthusiasm for the European project, there wasn't anything to indicate what his administration intends to do about competitiveness, structural reform, and the ongoing fiscal haemorrhage. And a government reshuffle - which might have indicated that structural progress was being taken more seriously, especially if the current nutbar in charge of industrial policy, Arnaud Montebourg, got shifted or sacked - is still possible, but "not yet".

But there is one initiative that caught my eye. Currently, if you want something from Town Hall, or the local office of one of the government departments, or from the various social and medical funds, and you don't get an answer within two months, it's a deemed No. Naturally, this gives all the bargaining power to the famously obstructive French bureaucracy. The proposed initiative would change the deemed No, to a deemed Yes.

It's an excellent plan. It's not perfect - as one guy said when interviewed about it on France's TV2, sometimes you'd prefer a quick No to a delayed Yes - but it's absolutely on the right general track.
How much of it will actually get into legislation (apparently scheduled for September) remains to be seen, especially from a government with strong ties to the public sector unions, but hopefully it might be a wee straw in the wind of some new thinking.

And don't you love the word paperasserie, the French term for the cumbersome paperwork you need to get officials' approval? To English ears (and perhaps French, too), it neatly combines papers and harass.

Friday, 17 May 2013

Who do hotels rip you off?

Okay - I was down in Wellington on Wednesday, and staying overnight, so as to go to the Budget analysts' lock-up on the Thursday morning. As I was checking in at the hotel - not where I usually stay, since Wellington accommodation was apparently nearly all taken up, maybe because of the Budget, and I had to take what I could get - I happened to notice a sign at the counter, advertising the exchange rates the hotel used to convert US dollars or Aussie dollars into Kiwi. In both cases, the hotel offered a ludicrous rip-off exchange rate. According to the hotel, a Kiwi dollar would cost you US$1.05 or A$1.05, where in reality it actually costs more like 83 or 84 Aussie or US cents, if you were to buy it at a bank.

Why do hotels do this?

As I was thinking about it, it reminded me that I'd read something once, about a similar phenomenon - why does popcorn cost so much more at the cinema than it does in the supermarket? It took me a while to track it down, but it was a chapter in Steven Landsburg's wonderful book, The Armchair Economist: Economics & Everyday Life (The Free Press, 1994). One reviewer, by the way, described this book as "An ingenious and highly original presentation of some central principles of economics for the proverbial Everyman. Its breezy tone conceals the subtlety of the analysis. Guaranteed to puncture some illusions and to make you think", which you might think is nice but no more than the usual puffery of a new book, until you notice that the reviewer was Milton Friedman.

I'd like to be able to tell you that Landsburg had the definitive knock-out answer, but he didn't. He dismisses, for a variety of reasons, what you might call the layman's explanation, which is that the hotel guest, or the moviegoer, is the temporary captive of a monopoly seller. I didn't think that could be the answer, either: if there's workable competition in the hotel (or movie) market, and there likely is, then a hotel or cinema shouldn't be able to get away with it, since the hotel or cinema around the corner would scoop all the business at a better exchange rate.

The best Landsburg could come up with (and I haven't advanced the thinking much, either) is that the hotelier or cinema owner is pursuing some sort of price discrimination strategy in a world where willingness to pay for popcorn and willingness to pay for cinema tickets varies across cinemagoers, and that could explain why all the other hotels and cinemas do it, too. He may not have had a clearcut answer to what's going on here, but even so read the chapter. It's an excellent explanation of price discrimination, and the rest of the book is equally informative and entertaining.

What bothered me about this price discrimination explanation, if that's what's actually happening, is that it clearly has the capacity to backfire in a highly embarrassing way. Prices that consumers know are exorbitantly above cost have a number of unpleasant consequences for the companies that charge them. For one thing, consumers are likely to think: if they're ripping me off on popcorn, they're probably ripping me off on everything else. They'll start thinking: why pay to go to the cinema at all? If they're ripping me off, I'll rip them off: I'll download the film for nothing over the Internet. Or, in another context, one consumer making a huge song and dance in the newspapers about the $2,000 bill for their smartphone roaming charges, probably puts off many hundreds of other consumers from turning their phones on in Sydney or London. If the cinema owner had a strategy of lower-than-otherwise movie tickets and higher-than-otherwise popcorn, now he's brassed off the popcorn eaters, and he's left with lower revenue from the ticket-only customers. And in areas where there may be some doubt about the degree of workable competition in the market, you're positively inviting in the prospect of regulation with open arms, mobile roaming being a classic example.

Maybe the silly popcorn price, and the silly exchange rate, are rational strategies from some perspective or other, but if they are, they still strike me as high-risk strategies to pursue. I wonder if there's something else going on?



Yesterday's Budget and the transparency of fiscal policy

We sometimes get tempted to feel that things are done better in other countries - policies are smarter, incomes are higher, they have proper soccer teams - but there's one area in particular where we can credibly say we are among the world's best (maybe the best), and that is the transparency around fiscal policy.

It may not be the most exciting thing in the world to excel at, but let's give three loud cheers for the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994. Our governments have to produce regular, complete, short- and long-term disclosure, on a conventional General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) basis, of their current and future tax and spending commitments. They have to show the current and projected state of the government's   balance sheet, and they have to disclose all those pesky off-balance-sheet items that governments tend to use when they want to keep expensive future bills or other embarrassments out of the voters' gaze.

We saw it again yesterday, with credible multi-year projections of taxes, spending, and debt, and with full disclosure of off-balance sheet items (in the 'Specific Fiscal Risks' part of the BEFU). We saw some alternative scenarios modelled, and we got the separate forecasts of tax revenue produced by the IRD and Treasury (they weren't much different, as it happened). In many countries, if there were conflicting agency views of the likely tax take, even the mere fact of disagreement would be swept under the carpet, and the numbers themselves would certainly never see the light of day.

The Act, in short, has proved to be an excellent watchdog on what New Zealand governments do and plan to do. Apart from being good practice in itself, it helps to prevent the sort of nonsense that happened (for example) in Ireland before it all turned to custard. In 2006, Ireland was supposedly running a useful surplus (2.9% of GDP), and in 2007 was still marginally in the black. In reality, the underlying position was out of control. Tax revenues were (temporarily) swollen by the government's share of the red-hot property market. Shorn of the government's slice of the property speculation game, the fiscal accounts were massively underwater - by 5.6% of GDP in 2006 and by a stonking great 8.4% of GDP in 2007 (all figures from the IMF's database, with the 'true' position being the IMF's measure of the 'structural' balance).

So it may be on the dull and policy-wonk end of the spectrum, but the Fiscal Responsibility Act has become an indispensably valuable part of good policy governance.

Before getting too holier than thou about the whole thing, though, it's worth adding that we needed it. I've been going to Budgets and Budget analysts' lock-ups (the embargoed pre-Budget access to the Budget  materials) since the mid 1980s, and my abiding memory of the earlier ones is this: what hornswoggling swindle are they trying to pull off this year?